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Abstract. Developing countries institute policies to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) that promo-
tes growth and development. Corruption disrupts and complicates the implementation of policies that 
govern the inflows of FDI and the operations of foreign firms; such interference with policies is more than 
likely to disrupt and lower the inflows of FDI. This paper evaluates whether or not corruption reduces 
inflows of FDI into each and every developing country.  Our study shows that developing countries with 
high growth rate (> 6% annual GDP growth) attract more FDI than countries with low growth rates 
although they are both steeped in corruption. Multi-national Corporations (MNCs) seem willing to 
cope with corruption in countries with high growth rates.
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Introduction 
The study of international business has become of critical importance in the 21st cen-
tury, serving many critical roles in the relationship between both developed and devel-
oping nations.  It allows businesses in the first-world to achieve resource and produc-
tion efficiencies while expanding into new markets, all of which allow them to maintain 
product and financial competitiveness. It also fuels development in developing coun-
tries, thereby transforming the “developing” from a euphemism for “underdeveloped” 
into an active process towards becoming developed. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
inflows a developing country needs to improve its economic condition. FDI increases 
capital stock and can increase a country’s output and productivity.
However, corruption threatens to derail the progress of developing nations by 
staunching the flow of FDI into these countries. Sadly enough, the more underdevel-
oped a nation is, the greater appears to be its level of corruption. Officials engage in a 
mad scramble to pocket as much of the incoming financial resources as possible for 
themselves and their families and friends, even if at the cost of future development. The 
pocketing of bribes drives up the cost of doing business, the cost to consumers and adds 
to market impenetrability, thereby making the host country less attractive to more FDI. 
Host country governments are constantly seeking to attract more international busi-
ness, and this can only be harder if a country becomes known for attracting the wrong 
kinds of MNCs who constantly engage in corrupt practices. This will only cement their 
place among the collection of corrupt countries which will scare away good FDI for sev-
eral reasons. Firstly, large developed countries have laws against the bribery of foreign 
public officials. Cementing your country’s reputation as a corrupt FDI location will 
surely bring more scrutiny to the operations of MNCs from home countries with strong 
anti-corruption laws, thereby making it more difficult for them to operate in your coun-
try. Additionally, cementing your place as a corrupt country means that the costs and 
risks associated with FDI will be known to be that much greater (since pervasive cor-
ruption appears to be the big deterrent of FDI) and so investment in your country will 
be less attractive. Additionally, if it becomes an accepted fact that MNCs within a host 
country operate corruptly, then incoming MNCs can expect that they will be required 
to engage in corrupt practices in order to survive there, and this becomes an additional 
entry barrier to your country, especially for MNCs from countries without experience 
in dealing with corruption and laws against it. 
And why should home counties care about corruption, passing laws and making 
it illegal for their MNCs to bribe foreign officials? Well, first of all the reliance on cor-
rupt practices undermines not just the host country’s image, but also the home coun-
tries. This can conceivably taint not just a group of investment locations, but also home 
country investment sources. If locations can become tainted with a reputation for at-
tracting dirty FDI, then home countries can also become conceivably tainted and have 
their FDI politely rejected by desirable locations.  So a developed country’s businesses 
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can only become noncompetitive if it relies on corrupt practices. Additionally, MNCs 
which become powerful by corrupting foreign officials will become very skilled in the 
practice (convinced of its correctness) and try it back home so that all the arguably 
tainted money made by bribing officials may come back to haunt the home country.  
In this paper, we seek to evaluate whether corruption affects FDI inflows into every 
developing country. Developing countries need to attract more FDI, so our study has 
huge implications for policy decision makers and governments in the developing coun-
tries. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I consists of literature review 
and theory development, Section II explains the methodology and the motivations 
for the dependent and independent variables, Section III deals with data collection. 
Section IV presents the empirical results, and Section V concludes with summary and 
future research suggestions. 
I. Literature Review and Theory Development
The study of the effect of corruption on FDI is predictably fraught with contradictions 
and opposing perspectives. Within the study of corruption’s effect on FDI, there are 
several camps. The first major camp comprises those who are primarily interested in the 
purely economic rationale for practicing or avoiding corruption. Most believe that low-
er corruption relates to higher inflows of FDI, they believe that lowering of corruption 
causes a greater inflow of FDI. Within this camp, there is a much smaller but possibly 
equally important camp composed of those who reverse the relationship, proposing 
that increasing FDI results in a lowering of corruption within a country.
There is another paradigm which addresses the moral aspects of corruption’s effect 
on FDI. This is divided among two camps including the “moralists” who believe cor-
ruption is bad and should be avoided at all costs, while the “revisionists” see it as a pos-
sible obstacle to the successful execution of business transactions and nothing more.  In 
fact, some argue that it is probably justified since it accommodates competition in some 
cases. In fact, some revisionists think of corruption as a good thing in transition econo-
mies, since it aids in the speedy execution of transactions (especially when institutions 
are being reformed but have not yet settled into a productive pattern of regulation), 
thereby allowing businesses to place a value on and consequently negotiate a price for 
the “expedition of government processes.” 
FDI
Stephen Hymer’s widely referenced 1961 thesis on FDI has turned out to be the sem-
inal work on FDI and the MNC. Literature on FDI has been revised and taken several 
tracks, but Hymer’s work has stayed relevant after nearly half a century. Hymer in his 
seminal work, posited that: 
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Firms undertake operations in a foreign country in order to appropriate fully the returns to certain 
abilities which they possess. They chose this method rather than an alternative such as licensing 
because the imperfections in the market prevent the fullest realization of profits unless the firms 
exercise some control. (Hymer, 1960/76, p. 3).
What influences FDI – country characteristics
Demonstrating the inherent difficulty in operating as an MNE, Rugman (2005) studies 
the largest MNEs. He points out that while the 500 largest firms in the world are brand-
ed as MNEs, in fact almost all of them operate mainly within their home regions within 
the triad of North America, EU and Asia.  
Lim (2003) points to a 1988 UNCTAD report on Incentives and foreign direct invest-
ment, which indicates that Economic factors including market size, cost of labor, raw 
materials and strategic assets and technology are some of the key determinants of FDI. 
Other factors include business facilitation such as investment promotion, incentives 
and administrative services.
FDI patterns are affected by other country factors such as market size and growth, 
nearness to markets, legal and political factors as well as economic conditions. Host 
country similarity to the home country is also expected to affect investment patterns 
(Davidson, 1980). 
The view exists that host governments need to use strategic marketing at a national 
level in order to secure FDI, equating marketing a country as an attractive location for 
FDI, similar to the manner in which companies market their products (Lim, 2008). 
Spending in investment promotion has been shown to positively influence FDI (Moris-
set & Andrews, 2003). They find that an increase of 10% spending on country promo-
tion yields an increase of 10% in FDI and that, on average, creating one job requires 
about $400 of promotion.
What influences FDI – government policies
Trade barriers, fixed exchange rates, tax-laws which discriminate against foreign goods, 
bad labor and wage policies which create factor disparities are some government-based 
disruptions which motivate FDI. For example, a trade barrier may cause a firm to invest 
in production facilities inside those barriers in order to get around the barrier and ac-
cess the market (Calvet, 1981).
(Root, 1978) investigated several variables for their effect on FDI such as corporate 
taxation, tax incentives and other policy variables (including attitudes to joint ventures, 
local content requirements and limitation on foreign personnel). Only corporate taxa-
tion was found to be significant. 
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What deters FDI – country characteristics 
Sethi et al. (2002) point out that even if a country’s investment incentive agencies put 
in place the best investment promotion strategies, but the country lacks economic and 
political stability (a feature of which is high levels of corruption), then incentives to in-
vestment coupled with the best markets and low-wage factors would still not be enough 
to attract FDI. 
Corruption
Transparency International has added greatly to the body of knowledge on corrup-
tion through its researching and annual publishing of the Corruptions Perception In-
dex (CPI), which started in 1995. Corruption has been defined by Getz and Volkema 
(2001) as “The abuse of public roles and resources for private benefit or the misuse of 
office for non-official ends”. The usual forms in which it manifests itself in international 
business are bribery, extortion and embezzlement (Robertson & Watson, 2004). Kauf-
mann et al. (2003) describe corruption as an indication of a lack of respect for the rule 
of law, on the part of both the “corrupter” (usually a private citizen or business trying to 
buy their way around a rule or process) and the “corrupted” (usually an official accept-
ing money for those favors), in essence pointing to a “failure of governance”. 
Rodriguez et al. (2005) indicate that corruption usually rewards less-productive 
firms with incentives by awarding them contracts (which should have gone to more 
productive and efficient firms), in exchange for bribes. This acts as a penalty of sorts for 
firms who strive to be competitive through greater innovation and productivity. Many 
studies have indirectly addressed corruption as being part of a package of economic and 
political risk of foreign countries (Habib & Zurawicki, 2006).
Problems in defining/measuring corruption
There is an inadequate level of research on Multinational corruption due to a) difficulty 
in deriving definitions of corruption, b) the delicate nature of conducting research on 
the area, c) data collection problems, d) lack of consensus on political, social and eco-
nomic effects of corrupt practices. 
For a firm to operate successfully in a corrupt environment, it must also deal suc-
cessfully with the uncertainty of corruption which results from the secrecy imperative 
and the fact that bribing one official does not preclude the bribing of others in order to 
guarantee the completion of government process. (Shleiffer & Vishny, 1993). Corrup-
tion discourages foreign investment because it is not “preannounced”. In addition, there 
is little-to-no enforceability of arrangements between the briber and the bribee, thereby 
injecting arbitrariness and uncertainty into the process of doing business (Wei, 1997). 
Firms therefore have great difficulty and risk in understanding the nature of the particu-
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lar type of corruption present in a country as different from its form in other countries 
(Rodriguez et al., 2005).
Aspects of corruption and their effect on FDI
Important aspects of corruption are pervasiveness and arbitrariness. Pervasiveness is 
the probability that an average firm will come across corruption in the course of doing 
business in a country. It gauges the extent to which a firm will find corruption una-
voidable in carrying out its commercial activities (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). In order to 
gain legitimacy, firms are likely to consistently choose environments which reflect their 
norms and values so as to avoid having to be “remade in the image” of their new envi-
ronment (Suchman, 1995). 
The arbitrariness of corruption, on the other hand, is the ambiguity coupled with 
the corruption practiced in a nation. This is caused by a lack of properly codified laws, 
which results in variability in what is legitimate (and naturally, what can be made legit-
imate for a price). Arbitrariness also causes the laws which are properly codified to be 
interpreted with inconsistency, leading to unstable application, supposedly depending 
on the price you are willing to pay (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2001). In situations of high-
ly arbitrary corruption, there is inconsistent application of the law, and so it cannot 
be predicted which bribes will be effective, providing the business person with quite 
a conundrum.  Oldenburg (1987) found that officials may drop hints like “I will think 
about it” suggesting that the potential briber must guess at how much of — and wheth-
er — a bribe will be effective. Exacerbating this situation is the fact that middlemen 
who collect bribes may or may not pass them. So, it is doubly hard to say what works 
and what does not (Banerjee, 1997). Cuervo-Cazurra (2008) proposes that corruption 
can have a positive or negative effect on FDI depending on whether it acts as “sand” or 
“grease” in the wheels of commerce.  The author proposes that corruption acts as sand 
by simply increasing costs where the markets are well established (and supposedly do 
not need substitute mechanisms) while introducing uncertainty since there is no legal 
recourse for failure to deliver on the promise, something that a contract would have 
provided. Cuervo-Cazurra (2008) proposes that in the absence of market institutions, 
however, corruption greases the wheels of commerce and may encourage FDI, making 
transactions happen faster and in some cases, allowing transactions to be completed 
when they otherwise would not have been possible. Corruption supposedly side-steps 
excessive or misguided regulations, thereby increasing competitiveness, since parties 
which normally would not have access to government decision making can gain access 
through corrupt processes. Leff (1989) posits that corrupt practices are part of the “ef-
fective” versus the “formal” system, allowing a firm to pay a price for the speeding up of 
an input, in effect, simply placing a business value on the input, which is equivalent to 
its worth to the firm. Kaufman and Wei (1999) find that the level of bribes a firm has to 
pay is related to the level of difficulties (not ease) that they face in doing business.  
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Studies of the effect of corruption on FDI
Dutta, Kar and Saha (2017) found that if a highly corrupt country lowers its corrup-
tion score, then FDI inflows increase for an equivalent rise in human capital stock. 
Hossain (2016) showed than a 1% decrease in the level of corruption leads to about 
8-11% increase in FDI inflows. Hakimi & Hamdi (2017) discovered that corruption 
is a serious hurdle to economic growth in MENA countries since it affects investment 
activities and FDI inflows. Fahad & Ahmed (2016) concluded that corruption im-
pacts negatively upon inward FDI in post – conflict countries in the long-run. Gossel 
(2018), on the other hand, found that corruption helps in bringing in more FDI in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.
Pervasive corruption is found to be more of a deterrent to FDI due to extensive and 
well documented knowledge about it and its effect in increasing costs to the producing 
firm. Because the investing firm is more aware of its nature, it will act more as a deter-
rent to FDI than its lesser known and more ticklish counterpart, arbitrary corruption. 
Arbitrary corruption drives up uncertainty in the investment, but this is already indi-
rectly factored into the equation for transition economies and so is somewhat taken for 
granted as part of a package of risks due to policies and practices which negatively affect 
business practices (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008).
It should also be pointed out that corruption has been found to affect FDI more sub-
stantially than its local counterpart—local investment (Habib & Zurawicki, 2001). Ab-
solute difference in the level of corruption between two countries has also been shown 
to have negative impact on FDI, according to Habib and Zurawicki (2002). 
It has been shown that transition economies receive large amounts of FDI despite 
suffering from high levels of corruption. A potential explanation of this is that corrup-
tion substitutes for market mechanisms which would not be present due to badly de-
signed or excessive regulation. As Huntington (1968) puts it:
… corruption produced by the expansion of governmental regulation may help stimulate eco-
nomic development. Corruption may be one way of surmounting traditional laws or bureaucratic 
regulations which hamper economic expansion (p. 68).
Why does corruption affect FDI negatively?
Tainting of the MNC’s corporate image
Investors may simply make a moral judgment sometimes and stay away in droves from 
countries which are perceived as corrupt because they do not want to be associated 
with them, for example, some African countries which received little FDI (Habib & 
Zurawicki, 2001). As mentioned before, there is also the issue of laws and conventions 
against bribing foreign officials. It is natural that MNCs would not want to put them-
selves in harm’s way, finding themselves in the unhappy position of having to choose 
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between offering bribes in order to keep their business afloat and staying out of jail by 
being isomorphic with home-country regulations.
Unmanageability of host country location
Corruption negatively affects the flow of FDI since it causes delays and uncertainties in 
business processes and naturally raises the cost of doing business (Habib & Zurawicki, 
2002). Corruption in the form of bribery represents resources that could be allocated 
in ways that are more efficient to the transacting of business, thereby causing a “distor-
tionary effect”. The bribes and extortion paid by the companies distort the real cost of 
doing business (Robertson & Watson, 2004). 
Companies which must pay bribes to do business lose precious time wrangling 
with the bureaucrats who take and require them (Kaufman & Wei, 1999). It also stifles 
competitiveness since it supplants efficiency and quality as drivers of organization com-
petitiveness. Additionally, despite the fact that market-seeking firms can absorb some 
amount of corruption (much better than efficiency seekers can), it causes earlier satura-
tion of the market since prices are higher and demand for products peak earlier, making 
the market less attractive to new entrants (Brouthers, Gao & McNicol, 2008). 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) points out that corruption does not have an equal level of 
unattractiveness to all investors with FDI to spend because there is a difference in cost 
to various investors.  Those who have laws against bribing foreign officials will think 
twice about investing in corrupt countries and so will limit the FDI into those coun-
tries, while those investors from corrupt countries (who likely have few laws dealing 
with it) already have experience (and would apparently know how to deal with the 
corruption) are undeterred by it. They may in fact seek out highly corrupt countries in 
which to invest. 
Studies argue that the type of host country corruption affects the entry mode cho-
sen by MNCs. They argue based on their 2-dimensional framework (of pervasiveness 
vs. arbitrariness) that the more pervasive the level of corruption, the more likely the 
MNC is to choose wholly owned subsidiary over local partnership in order to maintain 
internal legitimacy (so as not to get caught in a situation where a subsidiary it can only 
partially control taints its image by engaging in corrupt practices). The more arbitrary 
the corruption is, the more likely the MNC will enter through joint-ventures in order to 
increase external legitimacy: integrating with the corrupt environment and coping with 
the uncertainty it brings with it. (Rodriguez et al., 2005).
II. Methodology and Variable Descriptions
In developing countries which are de-regulating, due to the newness of the process of 
liberalization, many red-tape regulations introduced will be exploited by corrupt, op-
portunistic officials. Previous literature has shown that corrupt countries have more 
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burdensome regulations. Some studies suggest that over-regulation leads to corruption, 
whereas other studies argue the opposite: that more regulations is the result of corrup-
tion. We hypothesized that the level of corruption in a high-growth developing econo-
my is related to the number of new regulations. 
•	Hypothesis 1: Level of corruption is related to the number of regulations intro-
duced (post-liberalization).
•	Dependent Variable:  Corruption (Transparency International  
 Corruption perception index);
•	Independent Variable: # of regulations implemented in host country  
 (post liberalization);
•	Control Variable: Dummy variable coded 0 for the country with 
 growth rate < 6%, coded 1 for growth rate > 6%  
 (World Bank world-development indicators).
In developing countries, institutions and regulations are ineffective, and some pre-
vious researchers propose that corruption can grease the wheels of commerce, and can 
make transactions faster and, in some cases, allow transactions to be completed when 
they otherwise would not have been possible. Other researchers believe corruption 
adds extra cost and uncertainty to doing business and as such would hinder FDI inflow. 
We hypothesized that increasing corruption will (at least temporarily) promote the ex-
pediency of business transactions for MNCs and thus lead to higher FDI inflows. 
•	Hypothesis 2: Inflow of FDI into a developing country with a high growth rate 
(> 6% annually) is:
•	2a - Positively related to the level of corruption (corrupt home country);
•	2b - Negatively related to the level of corruption (non-corrupt home coun-
try).
•	Dependent Variable: FDI inflows (UNCTAD – World Investment  
 Reports);
•	Independent Variable: Absolute level of corruption in home country  
 (Transparency International Corruption  
 perception index);
•	Independent Variable: Relative level of corruption in home country  
 (home-country value minus host-country value) 
 (Transparency International Corruption perception 
 index);
•	Independent Variable: Dummy variable coded for MNC from home 
 country with/without anti-corruption laws;
•	Control Variable: Dummy variable coded 0 for the country with  
 growth rate < 6%, coded 1 for the growth rate > 6%  
 (World Bank world-development indicators).
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Previous researchers have shown that FDI inflows are affected by a number of fac-
tors. Countries with a large market size and / or low labor costs have location advan-
tage in attracting FDI. On the other hand, FDI inflows are negatively impacted by high 
production costs. In order to isolate the effect of corruption on the dependent variable 
(FDI), we controlled for other factors which create location incentives (such as mar-
ket-size or low labor costs) or discouragement (high production costs) for FDI so as to 
absorb their effect on the dependent variable.
•	Control Variable: Cost of labor {ILO Yearbooks of Labor Statistics – 
 (Bevan et al., 2004)};
•	Control Variable: Production Costs (Bevan et al., 2004);
•	Control Variable: Market size as indicated by GDP {IMF International  
 Financial Statistics - (Bevan et al., 2004)}. 
We carried out hypotheses testing by using ordinary least squares regression be-
tween the dependent variable and the respective independent and control variables for 
each hypothesis.
III. Sample and Data
Our sample consists of all countries in the world from the World Bank databases dur-
ing 2004-2017. Specifically, we obtained data on worldwide FDI inflows, country gross 
domestic products, country GDP growth rates, worldwide governance indicators1 and 
worldwide average labor costs from the economics database of the World Bank2. In ad-
dition, we retrieved data on corruption perception index from the website of the Trans-
parency International Organization3 for the period 2004–2017.  For regression analy-
ses, we created a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a country has a GDP growth 
rate in a certain year greater than 6 percent, and zero otherwise. Table 1 provides the to-
tal worldwide FDI inflows for 192 countries during the ten-year period (2004–2014). 
The descriptive statistics of the data is shown below.
TABLE 1: Worldwide total FDI inflow during 2004–2017
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Median N
Total FDI  
inflow during  
2004–2017 
(in USD)
111.731.928.700 1.392.893 Angola
3.383.385.000.000 
United States 10.066.220.000 192
1 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
2 http://data.worldbank.org/
3  http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
28
ISSN 2029-4581   eISSN 2345-0037   Organizations and Markets in Emerging Economies
Table 2 presents the worldwide average GDP growth rate for the period 2004-2017. 
There are 33 countries, most of which are developing countries, having GDP growth 
rates greater than 6 percent during 2004-2017. 
TABLE 2.   Worldwide average GDP growth rate during the period 2004-2017 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Median N
Growth 
rate 2017 3.12295
-5.9 
Yemen
8.15 
Ireland 3.16355 192
Average  
GDP growth  
rate 2004-2017
3.710314 -3.26 South Sudan
10.99 
Qatar 3.83 192
Table 3 shows the list of countries ranked by received FDI with corresponding Cor-
ruption Perception Index (2017). 
TABLE 3. Panel A: List of Countries by FDI received during 2004-2017 (in million USD) 
and Corruption Perception Index (2017) 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Median N
Total FDI  
scaled by GDP 0.072177
0.099 
Angola
0.3263 
Hong Kong 0.02963 165
Corruption  
Perception 
Index (2017)
43.07 9 Somalia
89 
New Zealand 39 180
TABLE 3. Panel B: Top 25 Countries by FDI received during 2004-2017 (in million USD)  
and Corruption Perception Index (2014) 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Median N
Total FDI  
scaled by  
GDP
0.079718 0.00118Italy
0.25966 
Luxembourg 0.03193 25
Total FDI  
inflows  
(in million 
USD)
429.284 112.572 Norway
3.383.385 
United States 3.25176 25
Corruption  
Perception  
Index (2017)
65.07
29 
Russian Federa-
tion
84 
Sweden 72 25
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The CPI index is compiled annually by the Transparency International ranking 
countries by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessment 
and opinion survey. The CPI index currently ranks 180 countries on a scale from 100 
(clean) to 0 (highly corrupt).
On average, most of top 25 countries are developed economies with very high CPI 
scores (Tabel 3, B). 
In addition to CPI index, we also used the World bank Worldwide Governance Indi-
cators (average score) consisting of five broad dimensions of governance for 214 coun-
tries over the period 2004–2017 as shown in Table 4.  
TABLE 4. Worldwide aggregated (average) and individual governance indicators  
for 214 economies over the period 2004–2015, for five dimensions of governance. 
Variable Minimum Maximum Median N
Corruption -1.68 Somalia
2.37 
Denmark -0.26 209
Regulatory -2.39 Korea, Dem. Rep
2.019 
Singapore -0.13 209
Government -2.25 Somalia
2.22 
Singapore -0.11 209
Voice account -2.19 Korea, Dem. Rep.
1.67 
Norway 0.12 204
Rule of Law -2.41 Somalia
2.02 
Finland -0.17 209
Five indicators include voice and accountability, control of corruption, regulatory 
quality captures, regulatory quality and government effectiveness4. The details of these 
indicators are described in the World bank handbook as follows: 
Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country’s 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Control of corruption captures 
perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, includ-
ing both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites 
and private interests. Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of 
4 The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality 
of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial 
and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-
governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms. The WGI do not reflect the 
official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used 
by the World Bank Group to allocate resources.
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public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the cred-
ibility of the government’s commitment to such policies [...] and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies (Kaufmann et al., 2011). 
Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formu-
late and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development.  Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of con-
tract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence. 
We report the average scores of the five aggregate indicators in their standard nor-
mal units, ranging from approximately –2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to 
better governance. 
IV. Empirical Results
We hypothesize that the association between inflow of FDI and the level of corruption 
(governance) is conditional on the high GDP growth rate. Specifically, we test Hypoth-
esis 2a: The Inflow of FDI into a developing country with a high growth rate (> 6% 
annually) is positively related to the level of corruption (governance). Our regression 
models are as follows:
FDI_Inflow (actual value) = α0 + α1GDP_growthrate + α2 CPI + α3Laborcost + 
+ α4GDP + α5 HighGDPgrowth DUMMY + εi  (1)
where FDI inflow is the total FDI inflow each year during 2004-2017; GDP_growth rate 
is the yearly GDP growth rate; CPI is the yearly Corruption Index Indicator; GDP is the log 
of total yearly GDP during the sample period.
HighGDPgrowth DUMMY is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if GDP growth 
rate is greater than 6 percent in a given year, and zero otherwise.
Scaled FDI_Inflow (scaled by GDP) = α0 + α1GDP_growthrate + α2 WGI + 
+ α3Laborcost + α4GDP + α5 HighGDPgrowth DUMMY + εi  (2)
where Scaled FDI inflow is the total FDI inflow scaled by GDP each year during 2004-
2014; GDP_growth rate is the yearly GDP growth rate; WGI is the yearly worldwide gov-
ernance index;  GDP is the log of total yearly GDP during the sample period.
HighGDPgrowth DUMMY is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if GDP growth 
rate is greater than 6 percent in a given year, and zero otherwise.
Table 5 reports the regression results of the association between high FDI inflows 
and better high-level transparency (high level of anti-corruption or better governance) 
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coupled with high GDP growth rate.  Table 5 (Model 1) reports the results from a re-
gression using CPI as one of the control variables. As predicted, Panel A coefficients 
on CPI are significantly positive (0.017 and p-value<0.001), indicating that there is a 
strong association between transparency and the inflows of FDI. The coefficient on the 
high GDP dummy variable is also statistically significant. This is consistent with our 
conjecture that countries with high GDP growth rate are more likely to receive more 
FDI during the sample period. 
Table 5 Panel B reports the coefficients on CPI and other control variables based on 
the regressions using the total FDI inflows scaled by total GDP as the dependent varia-
ble. Consistent with the results in Panel A, the coefficient on CPI is positive and statis-
tically significant at 1 percent (0.042 with t-statistics=3.12), indicating that countries 
with high CPI more likely received higher level of FDI inflows. While the coefficient 
on GDP growth rate is not statistically significant, the coefficient on GDP growth rate 
dummy is highly significant. Again, these results support our prediction that very high 
growth GDP countries would experience higher level FDI inflows.   
Table 5 presents cross-sectional regression results for the sample period 2004-2017. 
The dependent variable, FDI Inflow, is the log of total FDI inflows in a given year during 
sample period. Control variables include GDP, GDP growth rate, labor cost, CPI (cor-
ruption perceptions index), and a dummy variable for high GDP growth rate country. 
TABLE 5. Regression Analysis Using CPI as a proxy for Anti-Corruption
Model 1
Variables Dependent Variable
 Panel A: Log (FDI Inflows) 
Panel B 
FDI Inflows/GDP
Intercept 1.042 (3.9)
0.2213 
(5.41)
GDP 0.89 (3.41)
-0.016 
(-2.39)
GDPGrowth Rate 0.106  (1.32)
-0.059  
(1.29)
CPI  0.017*** (3.91)
0.042*** 
(3.12)
Labor Cost -0.132*** (-2.60)
-0.146*** 
(-4.9)
High Growth Dummy 0.435*** (3.96)
0.412*** 
(7.60)
R-squared  0.61***  0.16
Note: Standard errors of the coefficients are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentile to avoid outliners.
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As a robustness check, we re-run our regressions with World Governance Indicators 
as a proxy for the level of anti-corruption in each country instead of Corruption Per-
ceptions Index (CPI). We use Voice and Accountability Index, Control of Corruption 
Index, Regulatory Quality Index, Regulatory Quality Index, Government Effectiveness 
Index in Model 2, respectively. 
Table 6 presents coefficients on these indicators along with other control variables. 
Consistently with the results from Model 1, all coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant. 
This table presents cross-sectional regression results for the sample period 2004-
2017. The dependent variable, FDI Inflow, is the log of total FDI inflows in a given year 
during sample period. Control variables include GDP, GDP growth rate, labor cost, 
WGI indicators, and a dummy variable for high GDP growth rate country. 
TABLE 6. Regression Analysis Using WGI as proxy for level of anti-corruption
Dependent variable (FDI inflows)
Variables Model 2
 Regulatory Indicator 
Corruption
Indicator
Government
Indicator
Rule of Law
Indicator
VoiceAccount In-
dicator Indicator
Intercept 1.826***(2.14)
1.536
(1.42)
1.746*
(1.82)
1.678*
(1.71)
1.395
(1.12)
GDP 0.8316***(24.8)
0.8652***
(24.77)
0.8526***
(24.68)
0.8423***
(24.62)
0.8613***
(24.14)
GDPGrowth 
Rate 
0.1856*** 
(2.54)
-0.1224
(-1.7)
-0.1470
(-1.64)
-0.1456
(-1.66)
-0.122
(-1.32)
CPI  0.4782***(5.68)
0.2324***
(3.48)
0.2729***
(3.84)
0.2576***
(3.26)
0.0614***
(2.82)
Labor Cost -0.1920***(-3.45)
-0.1621***
(-2.76)
-0.1526***
(-2.68)
-0.1624***
(-2.78)
-0.285***
(-2.19)
High Growth 
Dummy
0.5316***
(3.86)
0.5167***
(3.26)
0.5326***
(3.18)
0.5384***
(3.29)
0.5164***
(3.21)
Rsquared 0.59 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.58
Note: Standard errors of the coefficients are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentile to avoid outliners.
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V. Conclusion
Developing nations try their best to attract FDI,  but their systems and regulations are 
ineffective and not fully functional, and it creates greater opportunities of corruption. 
There is extensive previous literature on the association between inflow of FDI and the 
level of corruption. Our paper adds to the literature by making the association between 
the inflow of FDI and the level of corruption conditional on high GDP growth rate. 
Some earlier studies have shown that high corruption in developing countries leads to 
high inflows of FDI because bribery mitigates the impact of institutional inefficiency 
and benefits FDI inflows. Other studies have shown that high corruption is a disincen-
tive for FDI inflows because bribery increases the risk and uncertainty faced by inves-
tors, and it is an additional cost of doing business.
Our paper clearly demonstrates that higher FDI inflows to highly corrupt countries 
are conditional on high GDP growth rate. International investors are not deterred by 
high corruption if it is associated with high growth. They are willing to invest in highly 
corrupt countries if they have high GDP growth rate. International investors are look-
ing for higher growth opportunities, and they are willing to accept corruption as a cost 
of doing business if it leads to higher returns in high GDP growth countries. 
In terms of economic policy, there is a clear message to the policy makers. The devel-
oping countries should take steps to improve their investment climate and undertake 
institutional reforms to raise their growth rates because FDI inflows are sensitive to 
higher growth rates.
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